LUIGI SPERANZA, GRICE ITALO: UN DIZIONARIO D'IMPLICATURE: A-Z T TIN

 

Luigi Speranza – GRICE ITALO!; ossia, Grice e Tincani: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del ivstvm qvia ivssvm – Roma -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo -- Luigi Speranza, pel Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Speranza (Reggio Emilia). Reggio Emilia, Reggio Emilia.  Abstract. Keywords. IVSTVM. Filosofo italiano. Persio. Philosopher of law, Bergamo.  Laurea in Giurisprudenza, Parma. Premio di laurea “Corrado Pecorella” per la miglior tesi di laurea in materia storico-filosofica, Parma, Torino. Borsa di studio dell’Università di Parma per perfezionamento -- Paris -- Ammissione al Dottorato di ricerca in Filosofia politica – Pisa.  dottore di ricerca -- valutazione: ottimo -- Assegno di ricerca biennale (rinnovato per un ulteriore biennio) in Filosofia politica – Università Statale di Milano, Facoltà di Scienze politiche   Ricercatore in Filosofia del diritto Bergamo Affidatario dei corsi di  Filosofia del diritto, Teoria generale del diritto, Filosofia e informatica giuridica, Etica giuridica,  Teoria dell’argomentazione  Professore associato – Cattedra di Filosofia del diritto Bergamo -- abilitazione scientifica nazionale alla I fascia ssd IUS/20-Filosofia del  diritto Pubblicato saggi in forma di articolo su riviste scientifiche e su riviste di critica  politica, o in forma di contributo a volumi collettanei. Collabora con  Ragion Pratica, MicroMega, Il Mulino, Medicina delle dipendenze, Rivista di Filosofia del diritto,  Politeia, Sociologia del diritto, ARivista anarchica, Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche e altre riviste. Partecipa come relatore a congressi e ha tenuto lezioni e seminari in  molte università italiane.  Principali pubblicazioni recenti  Monografie:  - Argomenti di giustizia distributiva, Giappichelli, Torino,  “Ovunque in catene”. La costruzione della libertà, M&B, Milano, Le nozze di Sodoma. La morale e il diritto del matrimonio omosessuale, Ornitorinco, Milano,  Perché l’anti-proibizionismo è logico e morale, Sironi, Milano, Filosofia del diritto, Le Monnier-Mondadori Education, Milano, Curatele:  - Viva la Rivoluzione!, Rizzoli, Milano, Genesi e struttura dei diritti, Ornitorinco, Milano, con Davies “Un fortunato libriccino”. Attualità di Cesare Beccaria, Ornitorinco, Milano,  con Cammarata e Letizia Mancini) Diritti e culture. Un’antologia critica, Giappichelli,  Torino, Con Rossi) I diritti forzati. Conversazioni sulla follia a quarant’anni dalla Legge  Basaglia, Ornitorinco, Milano,  - (Con Massimo La Torre), La dimensione ideale del diritto. Discutendo con Robert Alexy,  Giappichelli, Torino,  Contributi in volume:  - La costruzione normativa della follia. In I diritti forzati, Ornitorinco, Milano, 2018 - Il riconoscimento del diritto, in Pintore – Zorzetto (eds.), Studi di filosofia analitica del diritto per  Mario Jori, ETS, Napoli,  - Un altro dono dello spirito maligno, in Pelliccioli, La privacy nell’età dell’informazione.  Concetti e problemi, L’Ornitorinco, Milano - La stanza cinese, i database, l’esperto, in Perri-Zorzetto, Diritto e linguaggio Il prestito  semantico tra le lingue naturali e i diritti vigenti in una prospettiva filosofico e informatico giuridica, Ets, Pisa, Controllo e sorveglianza, in Brighi-Zullo, Filosofia del diritto e nuove tecnologie, Aracne, Roma - La legge 40 e la civiltà giuridica. In: (a cura di): Azzalini Marco, La procreazione assistita, dieci  anni dopo: evoluzioni e nuove sfide. vol. 6, Aracne, Roma  - Retribuzione, deterrenza, riabilitazione. In: (a cura di): Davies Richard;Tincani Persio, Un  fortunato libriccino. L'attualità di Cesare Beccaria, Ornitornicono, Milano,   - "Muoia un solo uomo". Utilitarismo e pena di morte tra Caifa e Beccaria. In: (a cura di): Cananzi  D.;Righi R., Ontologia e analisi del diritto. Scritti per Gaetano Carcaterra, Giuffré, Milano,   - Diritti-truffa. In: (a cura di): Cammarata Roberto, Chi dice universalità. I diritti tra teoria, politica  e giurisdizione, Ornitorinco, Milano,   - Omosessualità e discriminazione. In: (a cura di): Pezzini Barbara, Unioni e matrimoni same-sex  dopo la sentenza: quali prospettive?, Jovene, Napoli,  Diritti fondamentali. Proposta per una fondazione realista. In: (a cura di): T. P., Genesi e  struttura dei diritti, Ornitorinco, Milano, Harm Principle. Il principio del danno. In: (a cura di): SCIACCA F., L’individuo nella crisi dei  diritti, Il Nuovo Melangolo, Roma,   - Il fallito esperimento dei diritti presociali. In: (a cura di): SCIACCA F., Struttura e senso dei  diritti, Bruno Mondadori, Roma, Presentazione a “Diritto e futuro dell’Europa” – numero speciale della RIFD, Il romanzo e la realtà. Una lettura del Chisciotte, “Ordines”, Bēowulf e Grendel: il nemico e il suo doppio, “Ordines”, Qualche considerazione sulla sorveglianza dei consumatori, “Notizie di Politeia”, La cultura come nemico, Ragion Pratica”, Sorveglianza e potere, “Ragion Pratica”, Giù le mani dai bambini. Voto segreto sul Disegno di legge Cirinnà: chi strumentalizza davvero i  bambini? “Il Mulino Sei Umana? Hari Seldon e l’atteggiamento intenzionale, “ISLL Papers”, Esiste l'incapacità del volere?. MEDICINA DELLE DIPENDENZE, Legalizzare la cannabis, “Il Mulino Washington, Il Mulino  Principio del danno e omosessualità. DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE Efficacia delle norme e titolarità dei diritti. SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO  - La proibizione morale: considerazioni sulla legalizzazione delle c.d. "droghe leggere".  MEDICINA DELLE DIPENDENZE, vol. 4/2014  - "Common Heritage of Mankind": il caso dell’Antartide. DIRITTO & QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE,  Di forma e di sostanza, “Il Mulino Online”, 2013 - Droga, le ragioni per non proibire. IL MULINO, 3/2011 - Del matrimonio omosessuale. IL  MULINO, Organizzazione di congressi, seminari, giornate di studio (solo i principali tra i più recenti. Se  non diversamente indicato, presso l’Università di Bergamo): Una via italiana al positivismo giuridico: il garantismo di Luigi Ferrajoli, rel. J.J. Moreso    Ius e lex, rel. Andrea Padovani Sobre la carga de la prueba, rel. Jordi Ferrer Per una teoria degli standard di prova – Rel. Jordi Ferrer, Damiano Canale Harm to self / Harm to others: la legalizzazione della cannabis in California – rel. Mike  Vitiello Congresso nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia del Diritto  Legalize this! – rel. Mike Vitiello, Alberto Cadoppi Il realismo giuridico – rel. Carla Faralli  Prima lezione di diritto penale – rel. Giovanni Fiandaca (13/4/2018)  La norma che non c'è – rel. Barberis   Conflitti culturali – rel. A.E. Galeotti Giustizia. Teorie, principi, definizioni – rel. P. Tincani. M. Cuono, L. Malagoli, B. Magni,  N. Riva, L. Mazzone   Sicurezza e libertà – rel. P. Tincani, M. Barberis, M. La Torre, M. Bovero, A. Pintore, G.  Origgi, R. Escobar, E. Gargiulo, M. Cuono I diritti forzati. Trattamenti coattivi, concezioni del bene e forme del welfare – rel. T., Anastasia, P. Jarre, A. Massaro, S. Rossi, G. Losito. V. Marzocco, D. Dibitonto.  F. Poggi   Bartolomé de Las Casas. La conquista senza fondamento – rel. L. Baccelli, M. Barberis, R.  Cammarata C’è chi dice di no. Cittadini comuni che hanno rifiutato la violenza del potere – rel. Amedeo  Cottino L'obiezione è respinta" Analisi dell'Obiezione di coscienza in medicina – rel. Giubilini,  Minerva, M. Riccio, M. Mori, P. T.  Dipendenze. Aspetti giuridici, scientifici e sociali – rel. P. Cohen, P. Jarre, M. Croce, M.  Corti Partecipazioni come relatore a congressi/seminari/giornate di studio (solo le principali tra le  più recenti):  Il cespuglio di rovi. La ricerca delle fonti del diritto, Convegno “Il medioevo delle  mobilità”, Collegium Lunæ, Carrara, Le conseguenze del proibizionismo – Convegno “A volte ritornano. Disturbo da oppiacei  nel contesto attuale”, Ospedale di Treviglio, L’ultimo inganno di Ulisse. Colpa e follia in Inf. – “Traiettorie criminali –  Invenzione artistica e notizie di reato”, Università di Verona Privacy e nuove tecnologie – Relazione al convegno “Sette X Sette: viaggio nel futuro con  sette guide d’eccezione”, Festival di Altroconsumo, Milano,   Autodeterminazione e fine vita – Lezione presso la Summer School “Arpinate”  (UniCusano), Arpino Teoria della giustizia e Stato sociale – Lezione presso la Scuola Superiore della  Magistratura, Scandicci, La filosofia del diritto d’Alexy – Seminario internazionale in occasione del  conferimento della laurea honoris causa ad Alexy nell’Università “Magna Græcia”,  Catanzaro,   Feinberg. Il liberalismo e i confini del principio del danno (Università di Milano) Il Matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso tra liberalismi e perfezionismi (Università di  Milano), Dalla Paura alla Simpatia (Università di Milano), Etica, diritto e nuove tecnologie (Centro studi Politeia - Università di Milano), Droga. Di che cosa non stiamo parlando - Terni - Relatori P. Tincani e G. Nocentini  (Università di Perugia), Un altro dono dello spirito maligno. Privacy e comportamenti online (Università di Brescia),    “La costruzione normativa della salute” - Relazione di apertura della IV Convention  Nazionale Servizi di Prossimità, Bassa soglia e Riduzione del danno - Università di Torino La questione dello stato. Pensiero libertario e sfera pubblica - Università di Catanzaro,  La privacy ai tempi della rete - Università di Cagliari,   Riforma della Costituzione e del sistema elettorale - Università di Brescia, Laicità è far decidere ai cittadini le regole istituzionali" - Livorno, celebrazioni per il 145°  anniversario della Breccia di Porta Pia - Relatori: P. Tincani, G.M. Cazzaniga (Università di  Pisa), R. Caluri (Università di Pisa)   Il Principio del danno tra Mill e Feinberg (Università Bocconi di Milano),  Diritti inconcepibili (Università Bocconi di Milano),  When it comes to moral Justice δίκαιον and Scepticism, the claim that what Grice is presenting is a reconstruction of Socrates' original defense of moral justice δίκαιον rests on my utilisation of some of Socrates' leading ideas, notably on the idea that the presence of moral justice δίκαιον in a subject x depends upon a feature or features of components of x, that the relevant feature or features of the components is that individually each of them fulfills its role or plays its part, whatever that role or part may happen to be (or, perhaps better, taken all together, their overall state is one which realizes most fully their various separate roles), that in satisfying this condition, they, the components, enable x to realize the special and peculiar virtue of excellence ANDREIA or virtvs of the type to which x essentially belongs, that this fact entitles us to regard x as a good or well-conditioned T (where "T" refers to the type in question), and this in turn, if membership of T, or U, for universalia, if you wish to forget about Russell,consists in being a soul, ensures that the life of x is happy, in an appropriate sense of "happy." Grice’s account also resembles the original account given by Socrates in that it deploys the notion of analogy which is a prominent ingredient in Socrates' story, though it seeks to improve on Socrates' presentation by making it clear just why the notion of analogy should be brought into this discussion, and by making its appearance something more than an expository convenience. Grice’s presentation seeks also to link the idea of maximal or optimal fulfillment of function not merely with the concept of moral injustice non δίκαιον but more centrally and more directly with the more widely applicable concept of what one might call "health." This change carries with it an increase in the number of stages to be considered from two (the political and the moral) to three (the PHYSIOLOGICAL, the political, and the moral). Grice’s presentation also introduces the suggestion that the very same factors which determine whether a particular entity x, belonging to a certain type T, merits the accolade of being a T which is healthy, well-conditioned, or in good shape, also by their presence (in lower degrees) determine the difference between the existence or survival of x, rather than its non-existence, or non-survival, or lack of operancy. The same features, for example, which at the physiological stage determine whether a body is or is not well-conditioned, also determine by their appearance or non-appearance in lower degrees whether that body does or does not exist or survive, i. e. collapses instead. This example in fact calls for a more careful formulation. Grice proceeds to a more detailed discussion of the three stages recognized in his account. The complications are considerable, and intelligibility of presentation may call for omissions and convenient distortions. At Stage 1, the physiological stage, there appear a number of different items or types of item, viz.:  physiological things, such as human and animal bodies -- ф-thing,, -thing» ф-thingn; physiological components (ф-components or bodily organs. These will include both distinct types of d-component or organ, like the Liver and the Heart, and distinct instances or tokens of these types, like GRICE’S liver and  GRICE’S heart, or GRICE’s liver and STRAWSON’s heart. Entry will distribute a number of different types of bodily organ one apiece among human or animal bodies. For these purposes, sets of teeth and pairs of human legs will have to count as each a single organ. Functional properties of physiological components or organs. These correspond to the jobs or functions which the various organs crucially fulfill in the life of the -thing or body to which they belong, such as walking, eating, achieving, and digestion. For convenient  oversimplification I assume that each organ has just one functional property, which will be variable in degree.  (d) Certain properties of -things (bodies) ("global properties") which will be dependent on the functional properties exhibited by the arrays of physiological components or organs which belong to the things in question. The properties under this head which presently concern me are two in number: one, which will not be variable in degree, will be the property of existence or survival, which will depend on the array of physiological components belonging to a particular d-thing achieving a minimal level with respect to the functional properties of the members of the array, that is to say, a level which is sufficient to ensure that the array of physiological components continues to exhibit some positive degree of the functional properties of that array. The other -thing property which concerns Grice is one which will be variable in degree; it is the property of well-being, or well-being as a -thing of the sort to which it belongs. Maximal well-being will depend on an optimal combined exemplification of the functional properties of a -thing's physiological components. The higher levels of this latter property are commonly known as "bodily health" (with-out qualification), or as "bodily healthiness." At all levels the phrase  "bodily health" may be used to signify the dimension within which variation takes place between one level and another.  (3) Before I embark on a consideration of the details of subsequent stages, perhaps I should amplify the account of my intended proce-dure, including the general structure of my strategy for the characterization and defense of moral justice. The items involved in the stage 1 (physiological entities or bodies, their components or organs, the functional properties, and certain overall features of bodies, such as existence and being in good shape, which are dependent on the functional properties of organs) exist or are exemplified quite naturally and without the aid of analogy at this level. The stage therefore may be regarded as providing paradigms which may be put to work in the specification of related items which appear in subsequent stages and into the constitution of which analogy does enter.  (b) Those members of the list of items, mentioned in 3(a) as appearing in later stages, which are properties as distinct from things, may be specified in two different ways. One way will be to make use of abstract nouns or phrases which are peculiar and special to properties belonging to that stage, and which do not incorporate any reference to more generic properties specifications of which are found also at stages other than the one to which the property under discussion itself belongs. The other way is to build the specifications from what at least seem to be more generic properties, together with a differentiating feature which singles out the particular stage at which the specified properties apply. Leaving on one side for a moment the second mode of specification, I shall comment briefly on the first. This may be expected to yield for us, at the political stage, such properties as those expressed by the phrases "political justice" and "political existence," and by whatever epithets are appropriate for the expression of the features of this or that part of a state on which the global properties of political justice and political existence will depend.  Again, at the psychological stage, the first method will give us, unless the state is beset by illusion, expressions for the psychological properties of moral justice and psychological existence, and for the particular features of parts of the soul (whatever these parts may be) on which the presence of moral justice and psychological existence will depend. It will be noted that more than one important issue has so far been passed over; I have ignored the possibility that political and moral justice might be different specifications of a more general feature for which the name "justice," without added qualification, might be appropriate; I have left it undetermined whether "parts of the state" are to be regarded, as they were by Socrates, as particular political classes or in some other way, perhaps as political offices or de-partments; and I have so far ducked the question of the objects of reference of the phrase "parts of the soul." Such matters obviously cannot be indefinitely left on one side.  (c) I turn now to the considerably more complicated second mode of specification of the relevant range of properties. As already re-marked, this mode of specification will incorporate references to seemingly generic properties the appearance of which are not restricted to just one stage, a fact which perhaps entitles us to talk here about "multistage" epithets (predicates) and properties. Examples of second-mode specification will be such epithets as "is in good shape as a body" and "is in good shape as a state," both of which incorporate the more generic epithet "is in good shape" which seemingly applies to objects belonging to different stages, namely to animal bodies and to states. In addition to such "holistic" epithets which apply to subjects which inhabit different stages, there will also be "meristic" epithets, like "part" itself, which apply to parts of such aforementioned subjects. One of my main suggestions is that the multistage epithets which are characteristically embedded in second-mode specifications always, or at least in all but one kind of cases, apply only analogically to the subjects to which they do apply. I may remark that we shall need to exercise considerable care not to become entangled with our own bootlaces when we talk about analogical epithets, the analogical application of epithets, and analogical properties. Such care is particularly important in view of the fact that it is also one of my contentions that there will be properties the possession of which may be nonanalogically conveyed by use of the first mode, and analogically conveyed by use of the second mode.  It should be observed that although I have claimed that there are two different modes of property-specification, I have not claimed that for each individual property, at least within a certain range of prop-erties, a specimen of each mode of specification will be available for use; it may be that in certain cases the vocabulary would provide only for a second-mode specification, or that a first-mode specification can be made available only via a stipulative definition based initially on a preexisting second-mode specification. Since in my view most of the difficulties experienced by philosophers concerning this topic have arisen from doubts and discomforts about the applicability and consequences of second-mode specifications, gaps which appear in the ranks of first-mode specifications might be expected to favor neo-Socrates rather than neo-Thrasymachus, unless neo-Thrasymachus can make out a good case in favor of the view that where first-mode specifications are lacking, second-mode specifications will also be lacking; in which case the onus of proof will lie on the skeptic rather than on his opponent. It should also be observed that further discus-sion of the relation between second-mode and first-mode specifications might make a substantial contribution to two distinct philosophical questions, namely:  (i) whether it is sometimes true that description presupposes valuation (since second-mode specification seems only too often to rely on ideas about how things should go or ought to go);  whether it is sometimes or always true that valuation presupposes Teleology or Finality, since second-mode specifications characteristically introduce references to functions and purposes.  (d) I shall now recapitulate the main features which I am supposing to attach to first-mode and second-mode specifications, with a view to raising some further questions about the two modes: Properties which will be specified, when one uses first-mode specifications by single-stage epithets (properties like bodily health, political justice, and, perhaps controversially, moral justice) may also be specified by the use of second-mode specifications which will incorporate references to seemingly multistage properties such as wellbeing and existence. The property of bodily health, for example, may also be referred to as the property of well-being as a physiological entity, the property of political justice as the property of well-being as a political entity (or state), and the property of moral justice (perhaps) as the property of well-being as a psychological entity or soul. The global properties of well-being as this or that type of entity will depend on a maximal (or optimal) degree of fulfillment, by the various parts of the subjects of those global properties, of a sequence of meristic properties associated with the jobs or functions of those  (iii) The very same meristic properties on which the various forms of well-being depend will also determine, at a lower degree of realiza-tion, the difference between the existence and the nonexistence of the entities which inhabit a particular stage.  (iv) It might be possible, by a move which would be akin to that of  "Ramsification," to redescribe the things which inhabit a certain stage, their components or parts, the jobs or functions of such com-ponents, the property of well-being and the property of existence as being just those items which, in a certain realm, are analogical coun terparts to the prime items, in the physiological realm, respectively, of bodies, organs, bodily functions, health, and life (survival).  (v) These proposals might achieve a combination of generalizationand justification (validation) of the items to which they relate, given the assumption that the proposed redescriptions are semantically and alethically acceptable.  Among the questions which most immediately clamor for consideration will be the following:  Question 1: How are we to validate my intuitive judgment that second-mode specifications which involve multistage epithets will always, or at least sometimes, be analogical in character?  Question 2 is: How are we to elucidate the phrase used in (iv) "in a certain realm"?  (Question 3: How is it to be shown that the proposed redescriptions are not merely semantically but also alethically acceptable?  I will take these questions in turn.  Question 1 calls for the justification of a thesis which, without offering arguments in its support, I suggested as being correct, namely that if there are multistage epithets, that is to say, epithets which apply sometimes to objects belonging to one stage and also sometimes to objects belonging to another stage, the application of such an epithet to one, and possibly to both, of these segments of its extension must be analogical rather than literal. It seems to me that, before such a thesis can be defended or justified, it needs to be emended, since as it stands it seems most unlikely to be true. Consider first the epithet "healthy"; there would, I think, be intuitive support for the idea that when we talk, for example, of "a healthy mind in a healthy body," at least one of these applications of the epithet  "healthy" must be analogical rather than literal, since only a body can be said to be literally healthy. But if we turn to the epithets  "sound" and "in good order," though I think there will be intuitive support for the idea that both bodies and minds may be said to be sound or to be in good order, and indeed for the idea that bodies and minds can truly be said to be sound or in good order just in case they can truly be said to be healthy, there will not, I think, be intuitive support for the idea that the application of the epithets "sound" and  "in good order" to either bodies or minds, or to both, is analogical rather than literal. I would in fact be inclined to regard the application of each of these epithets to both kinds of entity as being literal. I would suggest that the needed emendation, while it allowed that the literal application of epithets may straddle the division between its applicability to subjects that belong to one stage and to subjects that belong to another, would insist that, when such literal cross-stageapplications occur, they depend upon prior cross-stage applications of some other epithet, where one or even both of the segments of application are analogical rather than literal.  How should the emended thesis be supported? My idea would be that the barriers separating the applications of an epithet to objects belonging to one stage from its application to objects belonging to another will in fact be category-barriers, and that there are good grounds for supposing that objects which differ from one another in category cannot genuinely possess common properties, and so cannot ultimately, at the most fundamental level, be items to which a single epithet will literally and nonanalogically apply. If objects x and y are categorically debarred from sharing a single property, then they are also debarred from falling, literally and nonanalogically, within the range of application of an epithet whose function is to signify just that property. There is nothing to prevent a body and a mind from being, each of them, literally in good order, provided that the condition needed for being literally in good order is that of being either literally healthy (in the case of a body) or (in the case of a mind) (analogically speaking) healthy. Perhaps the first matter to which we should attend in an endeavor to form a clear conception of (for ex-ample) the place of being (analogically speaking) healthy, a feature which may attach to minds, within a generalized notion of being in good order, or (perhaps) of being healthy, is the consideration that the question whether the application of a certain epithet to certain things is literal or analogical, is by no means the same question as the question whether its application to those things is or is not to be taken seriously. It may, for example, remain an importantly serious question whether Mill is properly to be regarded as a friend of the working classes long after it has been decided that, if the epithet  "friend of the working classes" does apply to Mill, it applies to him analogically rather than literally; it does not apply to him in at all the same kind of way as that in which the epithet "friend of Mr. Gladstone" may have applied or, perhaps, failed to apply to him. The question whether a particular person is in good shape may be a question an important aspect of which is expressed by the question "Is his mind (analogically speaking) healthy?"; if so, given that the first question is, as it may be, one to be taken seriously, the same would be true of the second question.  A second consideration, which we should not allow ourselves to lose sight of, is one which has already been briefly mentioned in thefirst part of this essay. We are operating in an area in which, not infrequently perhaps, we shall be under pressure from what Aristotle would have called an Aporia. We find ourselves confronted by a number of seemingly distinct kinds of items, and by a number of features each of which is special to one of these kinds. If we heed intuition — also, perhaps, if we heed the way we talk —we shall be led to suppose that these features are all specifications of some more general feature which is manifested, with specific variations, throughout the range formed by the kinds in question, a putative general feature for which ordinary language may even provide us with a candidate's name.  Furthermore, if we heed intuition, we shall be led to suppose that the members of this range of special features have a common explana-tion, a further general feature which accounts for the first general feature, and also, with the aid of specific variations, for the original range of special features. To follow this route would seemingly be just to follow the procedures which we constantly employ in describing and accounting for the phenomena which the world lays before us. In the present case, the application of this method would be to a range of items which includes bodies, states, and, perhaps, souls and also to such special features of these items as, respectively, bodily health, political justice [dikaion, ivstvm], and (perhaps) moral justice [dikaion, ivstvm].  Unfortunately, at this point, we encounter a major difficulty. The items which are the subjects to which the members of the range of special features attach, namely bodies, states, and souls, insofar as they are genuine objects at all, seem plainly to belong to different categories from one another. These categorial differences would be such as to preclude, if widely received views about categories are to be accepted, the possibility that there are any properties which are shared by items which differ from one another with respect to the kinds to which they belong. It looks, then, as if the possibility that there is a ‘generic’ property of which the special properties are differentiations, and the possibility that there is a further ‘generic’ property which serves to account for the first generic property, have both been eliminated. Grice in fact does not attempt to set out a theory of categories which would carry this consequence, and it would certainly be necessary to attempt to fill this lacuna. But the prospects that this undertaking would remove the difficulty do not at first sight seem encouraging. If, then, we are not to abandon all hope of rational solution, we shall be forced to do one of three things. Relinquish the idea of applying here procedures for descriptionand explanation which are operative in examples which are not bedeviled by category difference. Argue that the category differences which seem only too prominent on the present occasion are only apparent and not real. Devise a less restrictive theory of the effect of category differences on the sharing of properties. In the light of these problems, we should obviously be at pains to consider whether attention to the notion of analogical application would have any chance of providing relief. Grice proposes to leave this problem on one side for a moment, returning to consideration of it at a later point; immediately, Girce then addresses himself to a possible response to the suggestion that the question whether the possible application of a given epithet to a certain subject is an issue which it is proper to take seriously, is quite distinct from the question whether such application, if it existed, would be analogical or literal. The response would be that the distinction between the two questions does not have to be a simple black-or-white matter. It might be that, while the fact that, if such application existed at all, it would be an analogical application is not a universal obstacle to the idea that the application is one which should be taken seriously, it is also not true that there is no connection between the two questions. If the inquiry into the application of the epithet is one of a certain sort or one which is conducted with certain purposes in view, then the idea that such application would be analogical stands in the way of the idea that the application is one to be taken seriously. If, however, the character and purposes of the inquiry are of some other sort, the two questions may be treated as distinct. It might, for example, be held that if the inquiry about the application of an epithet is one which aims at reaching scientific truth, at laying bare the true nature of reality, the fact that the application of the epithet would be analogical conflicts with the idea that it should be taken seriously. If, however, the inquirer's concern is not with scientific truth but rather with the acceptability, either in general or in a particular case, of some practical principle, or principle of conduct, the two questions may be treated as distinct. Something like this "halfway" position is perhaps discernible in Kant. In, for example, his claim that an idea of pure reason, with regard to which no transcendental proof is available, Kant admits of a "regulative," but not of "constitutive" employment, a suggestion which is perhaps repeated in his demand for a non-dogmatic kind of teleology, a teleology which somehow guides our steps without adding to our stock of beliefs. The situation, however, is vastly complicated by the fact that the notion of what is "practical" is susceptible to more than one interpretation. On a wider interpretation, any principle or PRECEPT would count as practical, provided that it relates to questions about how one should proceed. On a second interpretation of "practical," only those examples of a principle or precept which is "practical" in the first sense will count as "practical" which relate not just to some form of procedure, but to procedure in the world of action OR WILLINGNESS as distinct from procedure in the world of thought OR JUDGINGS. An imperative which is practical in the second and narrower interpretation or sense will, as Kant himself seems to have thought, include this or that imperative which tells us how to act. Such interpretation of an imperative will not include an imperative which tells us how to think – or judge – cf. virtue etpistemics. Such an imperative will be concerned with the conduct of the business of life, but not with the conduct of the business of thought. This ambiguity leaves a principle or precept which concerns conduct of the business of thought in a somewhat indeterminate position. Such a principle or precept will be practical in the wider sense, since it is concerned with questions about how we should conduct ourselves. However, what is given with one hand seems to be swiftly taken away by the other, when we observe that the conduct such a principle or precept prescribes is conduct which is specifically involved in arriving at this or that decision about this or that scientific truth and the nature of reality. For Grice, the issue is made even more complicated by the fact that he has instinctive sympathy toward the idea that a so-called transcendental proof should be thought of as really consisting in the reasoned presentation of the necessity, in inquiries about knowledge and the world, of thinking about the world in certain very general ways. This view-point would introduce interconnections between what we are to believe or judge and how we are to proceed – or will -- which will be by no means easy to accommodate. Grice returns ten to discussion of the quandary which he propounded a little while ago, and the severe limitations on explanation seemingly imposed by category-differences between features which need to be explained. As he sees it, Grice’s task is to provide a somewhat more formalised characterisation of the phenomenon of analogical application than has yet been offered, perhaps a logico-metaphysical or ‘semantic,’ in termsof the ‘modes of signifying’ -- characterization, which will at the same time be one which both preserves those category-differences and their consequential features, and at the same time avoids undue restrictions on the application of standard procedures for the construction of an eschatological explanation. This may seem like a tall order, but Grice thinks it can be met. Let us first look at the notion of instantiation and at one or two related notions. If one is informed that x instantiates y -- that x is an instance of y --, and also that y specifies z --that y is a specification of z, that being y is a way of being z, that y is a form of z --, one is entitled to infer that x instantiates z. If, however, instead of being informed that y specifies z, one is informed that y instantiates z, the situation is different. One cannot infer from the information that x instantiates y and y instantiates z, that x instantiates z. The relation of instantiation is not transitive, since if azure specifies blue, and blue specifies colour, it looks as if azure must specify colour. Let us now define a relation of "sub-instantiation"; x will sub-instantiate z just in case there is some item or other, y, such that x instantiates y and y instantiates z. We might perhaps offer, as a slightly picturesque representation of the foregoing material, the statements that if x specifies y, then x and y belong to the same level or order of reality as one another, if x instantiates y, x belongs to a level which is one step lower than that of y, and that if x sub-instantiates y, x belongs to a level which is now TWO steps lower than that of y. Now it seems natural to suppose that, when a number of more specialized explanations are brought under a single more general and so more comprehensive explanation, this is achieved through representing the various features, which are separately accounted for in the original specialized explanations, as being different specifications of a single more general feature. If, however, we were entitled to say that the crucial relation connecting the more specialized explicanda with a generalized explicandum is not, or at least is not in those cases in which the specialized explicanda are categorically different from one another, that of specification but rather of sub-instantiation, we shall be able to avoid the uncomfortable conclusion that the admissibility of generalized explicanda involves the admissibility of the idea that categorically different subject items may be instances of common properties. An item need not, indeed perhaps cannot, instantiate that which it sub-instantiates.  To conclude his treatment of the quandary, Grice feels he needs to show, as best as he can, that a systematic replacement of references to the relation of specification by references to the relation of instantiation would have no ill effect on the standard procedure for generalizing a set of specialized explanations, with which we have provided ourselves, of the presence of discriminated specialized properties. To fulfill this undertaking, Grice considers two cases. One involves the application of a procedure for generalization which is characterized in terms which involve reference to the relation of specification, and the other in which all references to specification are replaced by references to additional and "higher-level" occurrences of the relation of instantiation. In the first, case, Grice starts with a group of particulars -- x, through x, --, with regard to each of which we are informed that it possesses property D; and with two further groups of particulars -- y, through Ym and z, through z, -- instantiating, respectively, properties E and F. The generalization procedure begins when we find further properties A, B, C, such that x, through x,, Y, through Ym and z, through Z, instantiate, respectively, A, B, and C; and (as we know or legitimately conjecture) A implies D, B implies E, and C implies F. We next find the more general properties P, Q, such that A and D, specify in way 1, respectively, P and Q; B and E, specify in way 2, respectively P and Q; and C and F, specify in way 3, respectively, P and Q  (iv) We are now, it seems, in a position to predict that whatever instantiates property P, will, in a corresponding way, instantiate property Q; that is to say, to predict for example that anything which has A will have D; and though I would hesitate to say that provision of the materials for systematic prediction is the same thing as explana-tion, I would suggest that, at least in the context which I am consid-ering, it affords sufficient grounds for supposing that explanation has in fact been achieved.  Case I1. Case Il begins to differ from Case I only when we reach stage (iii). In Case Il stage (iii), instead of saying that A and D specify in way 1, respectively, P and Q, we shall say something to the effect that A and D are "first group" instances, respectively, of P and Q; and precisely parallel changes, introducing, instead of the phrase "first-group instance" either the phrase "second-group instance" or "third-group instance" will be made in what we say about properties B and E and properties C and F.  Though I would not claim to have a wholly clear head in the mat-ter, it seems to me that the difference between Case Il and Case I generates no obstacle to the attribution of legitimacy of the procedure for generalization with which Grice is currently concerned. The scope for systematic prediction, and so for explanation, will be quite un-affected. If he is right in this suggestion I shall, I think, have succeeded in providing what was mentioned in Part I of this essay as a desideratum, namely a development of a concept of affinity, which would be less impeded by category-barriers than the more familiar notion of similitude. Grice then turns briefly to question Q2. This is the question how to interpret the expression "in respect to a certain realm" within such phrases as in "an analogical extension, in a certain realm, of the property of health – SANITAS --, in the primary physiological realm to which animal and human bodies are central." Grice should make clear the problem of ambiguity which prompts this question. There is one way of looking at things, one conception, according to which there is a certain realm, which is that to which souls are central, and into which there is projected an analogical extension of the property of health or SANITAS. In this conception the notion of a soul is logically PRIOR to the notion of the psychological realm to which souls are central, and both are logically prior to the property which is the analogical extension of the property of health or SANITAS, which in the primary physiological realm is the property of bodies. But there is another conception which might particularly appeal to those who regard a soul as being, initially at least, somewhat dubious entity, according to which a soul is introduced into the psychological realm to be the subjects or bearers of a property in that realm which is an analogical extension of the property of health, or SANITAS, which in the physiological realm belongs to the body, not the soul. According to this conception, fairly plainly, the conception of a soul is logically POSTERIOR both to the notion of the psychological realm and to the analogical extension of the property of health, SANITAS, which exists in that realm. MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO. Question 2 is in effect an accusation. It suggests that the two conceptions are mutually inconsistent, since a soul cannot be at one and the same time both logically prior to and logically posterior to both the concept of the realm to which it is  supposedly central and to a certain property, analogous to bodily health – CORPUS SANVM -- which exists in that world. It further suggests that Socrates (or neo-Socrates) need both of these conceptions, but, of course, cannot have both of them. To meet this objection, Grice suggests that a promising line to take would be to deny that we start with a certain realm, the psychological realm, the nature of which is determined either by the subject-items, namely a soul, which is central to it, or by the properties, such as a certain analogue of bodily health, or SANITAS – CORPUS SANVM -- which characterize things in it; and that we then proceed at a later point to add to it the remaining members of these two classes of elements. Rather, we start off with analogues of two of the elements in the primary physiological realm, a soul which is analogue of a body, and a class of properties one of which is an analogue of bodily health, SANITAS, CORPVS SANVM -- and call the realm to which these analogues belong the psychological realm. In this way the incoherence covertly imputed by question Q2 will be dissolved, since neither of these psychological elements – a soul and properties like the analogue of bodily health, SANITAS, CORPUS SANVM --  will be logically prior to the other. What in fact has been done is to introduce, first, a double analogical extension of two types of items which belong to the primary physiological realm and, second, the notion of a psychological realm for use in a convenient way of talking about what has initially been done. No doubt more than this will need to be said in a full treatment of the topic. But perhaps for present purposes, which are primarily directed toward defusing a certain criticism, what has been said will be sufficient. When it comes to the prospects for ethical theory, Question 3 might be expanded in the following way. We can imagine ourselves encountering someone who addresses us in the following way: "You have certainly achieved something. There is one class of philosophers who would be inclined to deny that the notion of moral justice, δίκαιον, can be regarded as an acceptable and legitimate concept, because there is no way in which the intuitive idea of moral justice, δίκαιον, can be coherently presented in a rigorous manner. What you have said has shown that such a philosopher's position is untenable; for you have shown that if we allow the possibility of representing moral justice, δίκαιον, as a certain sort of analogical extension of a basic notion, namely health, which is a property of bodies, items which belong to a basic or primary realm of objects, you have succeeded in characterizing in a sufficiently articulated way the possession of moral justice, δίκαιον, to which the philosopher in question is opposed on the grounds of its incoherence. That is no small achievement, but it is not, nevertheless, from your point of view, good enough. For there will be another class of philosophers who find no incoherence in the notion of moral justice, δίκαιον, but claim that lack of incoherence is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for accepting moral justice, δίκαιον, as a genuine feature of anything in the world. The uses that we make of our characterizations of moral justice, δίκαιον, and other such items must be as part of an as it were encyclopedic picture of the fundamental ingredients and contents of the rational world; and if, of the two would-be encyclopedic accounts, one contains everything which the other contains together with something which the other does not contain, while the other account contains nothing beyond a certain part of what the first account contains, it will be rational, in selecting the optimum encyclopedic volume, to prefer the smaller to the larger volume, unless it can be shown that what is contained in the larger volume but omitted in the smaller one is something which should be present in a comprehensive picture of the rational world. To be fit for inclusion in an account of the rational world, a contribution must be not only coherent but also something which is needed. This demand you have not fulfilled." To this critic Grice should be inclined to reply in the following manner. "I agree with you that more is required to justify the incorporation of moral justice, δίκαιον, within the conceptual furniture of the world than a demonstration that the notion of moral justice, δίκαιον, is one which is capable of being coherently and rigorously presented; and I agree that I have not met this additional demand, in whatsoever it may consist. But I think it can be met; and indeed I think I can not only say what is required in order to meet it but also bring off the undertaking of actually meeting it. The required supplementation will, I suggest, involve two elements. First, a demonstration of the value, in some appropriate sense of "value," of the presence in the world of moral justice, and second, a demonstration that it is, again in the same ap. propriate sense, up to us whether or not the notion of moral justice does have application in the world." I shall now enlarge upon the two ingredients of this proposed response.  First Supplementation. A person who is concerned about the realization in the world of moral or political justice, δίκαιον, will encounter at a number of points alternative options relating to such realization which he may have to take into account. The number of such options will vary according to whether a "two-concept" view or a "one-concept" view is taken of justice, δίκαιον; the number will be larger if a two-concept view is taken, and I shall begin with that possibility. On a two-concept view, there will be two properties the realization of which has to be considered, moral justice δίκαιον and political justice δίκαιον. One who is concerned about the application of these properties, and who is unhampered by any sceptical reservations, will have to consider the application of each of these properties to a particular individual, standardly himself, and also to a general subject-item, such as a particular totality of individuals each of whom might consider the application to himself as an individual of each of the initial properties. There will also be a variety of distinct motivational appeals which the application of one of these forms of justice, δίκαιον, has to a particular subject-item, the consequential appeal of that realization (e.g. its payoff), or both. If we go beyond Plato, we might have to add such forms of motivational appeal as that which arises from subscriptions to some principle governing the realization of the initial property. On a one-concept view the initial array of options will be considerably reduced, though it is perhaps questionable whether such reduction will correspond to any reduction in genuinely distinct and authentic options. On the assumption that it would not, Grice temporarily goes along with the idea that a one-concept view is the correct one. On this view a distinction between moral justice, δίκαιον, and political justice, δίκαιον, will reappear as the difference between concern for the application of a single property, that of justice, δίκαιον, when it is motivated by the intrinsic appeal of its realization in a given subject-item (one might perhaps say its moral appeal) or alternatively, when it is motivated by the idea of the consequence of such a realization (one might say by its political appeal). One should perhaps be careful to allow that the idea that a single concept or property may exert different forms of motivational appeal does not carry with it the idea that one and the same body of precepts will reflect that concern, regardless of the question whether the motivational foundation is moral or political.  It is crucially important to recognize that situations which are only subtly different from one another may exert quite different forms of motivational appeal. Nothing has so far been said to rule out the possibility that while Socrates and other such persons may each be concerned that people in general should value the realization of justice, δίκαιον,in themselves because of its intrinsic appeal, that is to say, for moral reasons, nevertheless their concern that people in general should value for moral reasons the realization in themselves of justice, δίκαιον, is based at least in part on consequential or political grounds rather than on any intrinsic or moral appeal. It is possible to be concerned that people be sensitive to the moral appeal of being just, δίκαιον, and at the same time for that concern to be at least partly founded on political rather than on moral considerations. If that is so, then the concern for a widespread realization of moral justice, δίκαιον, might itself have a non-moral foundation, as Prichard attempted at Oxford with his duty and interest, repr. by Urmson. Such considerations as these might be sufficient to ensure that the realization of moral justice in a community is of value to that community. This value might consist in the fact that if themembers of a community are morally concerned for the realization of justice, δίκαιον, in themselves, their manifestation of socially acceptable behavior will not be dependent on the real or threatened operations of law-enforcers, to the advantage of all.  Second Supplementation. If we were to leave things as they are at the end of the first supplementation, though we should perhaps have shown that the realization of moral justice in the world was of value to inhabitants of the world and possibly also absolutely, we should not have escaped the suggestion that this alone is not adequate to our needs; it would leave open the possibility that all one could do would be to pray that moral justice, δίκαιον, is realized in the world, and then when we have found out whether this is or is not the case, to jubilate or to wail as the case might be. To make good our defense of moral justice, we should need to be able to show that in some sense the realizability of moral justice in the world is up to us. At this point it seems to me we move away from the territory of Socrates and Plato and nearer to the territory of Kant; it also seems to me that at this point the problems become immensely more difficult, and partly because of that, I shall not attempt to devise here a solution to them, but only to provide a few hints about how such a solution might be attained. As we have been interpreting the notion of moral justice, δίκαιον, its realizability is an idea which is very close to that of the validity of morality; and if we were to follow Kant's lead, we should be on our way to a supposition which is close to his idea that the validity of morality depends upon the self-imposition of law, an idea which, though obscure, seems to suggest that what secures the validity of Morality is something which, in some sense or other of the word "do," is something that we ourselves do, and so perhaps in some sense or other "could," we could avoid doing. What kind of "doing" this might be, and how it might be expected to support Morality, to my mind remain shrouded in darkness even after one has read what Kant has to say; there seems little reason to expect that it would closely resemble the kind of doing with which we are familiar in the ordinary conduct of life. There is also important uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the word "could"; it might refer to some kind of psychological or natural possibility, something which some would be inclined to call a kind of causal possibility; or it might refer to some kind of "rational" possi-bility, the existence of which would require the availability of a reason or possible reason for doing whatever is said to be rationally possible.  Not everything which is psychologically possible is also rationallypossible; and I think it might be strategically advantageous if it could be held that the Kantian view assigns psychological possibility but not rational possibility to the avoidance of the institutive act which underlies morality; but whether this is Kant's view, and how, if it is his view, it is to be made good, are problems which I do not know how to solve. When it comes to The Republic and Philosophical Eschatology, Grice presents what he sees as the background to the reconstructed debate between Thrasymachus and Socrates, or rather perhaps between neo-Thrasymachus and neo-Socrates. Neo-Thrasymachus is a Minimalist and a Naturalist who has affinities with Hume – and his name is Nozick; he rejects the concept of moral justice, δίκαιον, on the grounds that it would be at one and the same time a non-natural and psychologistic feature and also an evaluative feature. At this point we may suppose that neo-Socrates, who is not committed to any form of Naturalism, will have retorted to neo-Thrasymachus that a blanket rejection of psychologistic and evaluative features will totally undermine philosophy. This part of the debate is not recorded, but we may imagine neo-Thrasymachus to have responded that neo-Socrates is in no better shape; for he can make sense of the notion of moral justice, δίκαιον, only by representing it as a special case of a favourable feature, namely well-being, which spans category-barriers between radically different sorts of entities, such as a body, a political state, or a person. But neo-Socrates himself will be committed to holding a view of universals which will prohibit any such crossing of category-barriers by a single universal. To this charge neo-Socrates may resort to two forms of defense, one less radical than the other. The less radical form would involve the claim that while there have to be category-barriers, these do not have to be as severe and restrictive as the accusation suggests.  The more radical form of defense would refrain from relying on a more permissive account of category-barriers even though it allowed that such increased permissiveness would be in order. It would rely rather on a distinction between concepts which may span category-barriers, whether these are more or less severe in nature, and universals which may not span such barriers. A closely parallel distinction between  an expression's having a single meaning and its being used to ‘signify’ a single universal can, Grice thinks, be found in Aristotle. Vide Grice, “Aristottle on the multiplicity of being” and the three modes of unification of universalia via recursion – the logically developing series, the focus, or the analogy or proportion. This distinction would be made possible by making concepts rest ona foundation of affinities as distinct from the foundation of similarities which underlies universals; affinities may, while similarities may not, be characterizable purely in analogical terms. The working out of such a distinction would be one of a variety of concerns which would be the province of a special discipline of philosophical escha-tology. The key to its success would lie in the observance of a distinction between instantiation and subinstantiation. The latter notion would permit generalization and explanation to cross category-barriers and would undermine the charges of incoherence brought by neo-Thrasymachus against neo-Socrates and his favored notion of moral justice, δίκαιον. At some level of reinterpretation, then, Socrates's appeal to an analogy between the soul and Mussolini’s Italian state, say, would be at least partly aimed at showing that the concept of Moral Justice, δίκαιον, which Thrasymachus would like to banish as theoretically unintelligible, is analogically linked with the concept of bodily health, admitted by everyone, including Thrasymachus, as a legitimate concept, in such a way that, despite radical categorial differences between the two concepts, if the concept of bodily health is intelligible, the concept of Moral Justice, δίκαιον, is also intelligible.  However, to exhibit Moral Justice as a feature which is really applicable to items in the world, such as persons and actions, more is needed than to show that its ascription to such items is free from incoherence. It will be necessary to show that such ascription, if it were allowed, would serve a point or purpose, and also that it is in some important way up to us to ensure that such ascription is admis sible. The fulfillment of the last undertaking might force us to leav the territory of Socrates and Plato and to enter that of Kant, or even worse, if we follow Gentile, Hegel! Nome compiuto: Persio Tincani. Tincani. Keywords: iustum quia iussum, Bergamo, Pergamo. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Tincani” – The Swimming-Pool Library.